WHAT FIRST AND THIRD PERSON PROCESSES REALLY ARE[1]

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I. IMPLICIT UNDERSTANDING

This article will present a different view of "first person process," not what most of its proponents and objectors think it is. The new view will also enable us to understand the third person perspective differently.

First person process involves something I call "implicit understanding" (IU). Among many roles, implicit understanding functions in the coming of new concepts. How new concepts come will show us a lot about first person process.

I begin with the question: How do we generate new concepts? How do they come? Scientists and philosophers don't say much about how their concepts came. We are told why the new concept is better, but hardly ever how it came. Someone might say "It came to me in the shower."

The concepts of science change every few years and become more numerous and complex. It is well known that the new ones are not logically deducible from the old ones. But the existing concepts can only explain what follows logically from them. Novelty cannot be denied but it seems inexplicable. Therefore we have no account of change in science.

To study the coming of concepts and implicit understanding in no way undermines how the concepts we already have work explicitly. Concepts have logical implications, their own power for precise consequences. For example, while calculating our bank account we don't double one deposit because it came from a special source. Logical inference requires that we don't let something implicit upset the concepts. We must let them work as if they were alone, without us. All our technology depends on logical inference. Seven billion of us

[1] This is a revision of an earlier paper titled "Implicit Understanding."

couldn't all live on the planet without it. To undermine logic and explicit concepts is not sensible.

Of course we know that we generate and operate the concepts. How they work "alone" is something we let them do. This isn't very puzzling. Whatever else concepts are, they are tools. For example, for something to be a screwdriver it must be allowed to keep its own narrow head, and to engage the screw with it. We are holding it, of course, but the screwdriver's own pattern turns the screw. Complex machines even more obviously have their own results. So there need be no puzzle about concepts having their own logical inferences, quite apart from the fact that a lot is implicitly involved in the coming and having of the concepts.

We keep our system of existing concepts inviolate and separate. Then we can also have a second system in which we study how something implicit works in the coming of new concepts. We will be concerned throughout with the necessary separation, contrast, and relationship between the system of explicitly formed concepts and our second system about how something functions implicitly. Far from being in conflict, this article will show that if the two systems stay separate, they expand each other reciprocally.

Let me cite some examples of "implicit understanding" (IU): From just a few words we can grasp a complex situation. Someone reports: "Jim said no." The single statement of a single fact can reorganize how we now understand the situation. In the opening scene of Ibsen's Hedda Gabler a man comes to deliver a telegram. From how she treats him we suddenly understand the kind of person she is.

The coming of a new thought can reorganize a situation. "Oh, he's afraid of George!" we think, and immediately a great deal has changed. We would like to understand how such a new thought can come. Right here I am only pointing out the relationship between the occurring one and the implicit many of an implicit understanding.

Similarly, one perception can change our understanding of the whole situation, for example one smell ("Oh! . . . . ."). Laid out in words it might be "Oh!, that's the sauce burning! I left it on the stove when I went to answer the phone, and I don't have more stuff to make the sauce again, and there isn't time to go to the store, and . . . . ." But only the "Oh! . . . . ." was actually thought. The ". . . . . " includes much more: who is invited for dinner, and

why, and what sort of reactions they are likely to have, and many past events with them, and what could still be cooked, and much else. All of that is implicit in one "Oh!" How can so much be implicit in one syllable?

A great deal is understood implicitly, much more than we could separate out one by one. We see that one event can change the implicit many. Now I add: The changed many will change the next event, what we actually say or do next. So the one-many relation is really a one-many-one relation. The event can change what functions implicitly, and that can change the next event – which again changes the many. It is a "process."

The many are not thought separately. They change implicitly without ever having formed. Changing without ever forming is a hallmark of implicit functioning, as we will see.

We can always say some of the many, if we are asked. This is already being studied and can reveal a lot to the researcher about what was actually happening at any one moment. The "describing" is itself a behavior with many observable variances. Brief references to IU enable one to say more and more. There is hardly an end to what can be said just to "describe" one moment. About an hour's worth is typical.[2]

But usually we move on. The implicit understanding (IU) implies the next saying or doing, the occurring of which will change the implicit understanding so that it implies a further next saying or doing. We can study the process as well.

Usually we move on smoothly, but sometimes what the IU implied was not enacted by what we said or did. Then we may have a problem; it might be practical or theoretical. It might be obvious ("how can I make a good dinner without a sauce?") or subtle ("This tastes a little funny. What does it need?"). A theoretical problem may be obvious ("how do new concepts come?") or subtle ("I don't know what is wrong with this explanation, but something is").

Let us observe what we do when we try to solve a problem. We use not only statements; we think with something implicit as well. We state a problem in words as far as we can. Many things feed into the problem: We can repeat some of what we know, but we are just stuck if we have nothing but statements and an empty blank. To think further, we

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[2] See Petitmengin, this issue.

must attend to something implicit. We refer to it in shorthand by calling it "this," or "this but also that. . . . ." We hold on to the spot where we sense the problem: The spot is "this, but also that" and the dots: The ". . . . ." is where we can hope for new thoughts, where they could come.

A great gamut of things functions implicitly at such an edge: much common knowledge, our own special knowledge, everything we have read, heard, why we think it's important, and much else. We refer directly to "all that." It is an implicit understanding (IU). But we also "understand" that we don't understand some of it, although it is all one situation or one problem. That we sense this difference is quite important and remarkable because it is the "edge" of our IU where further thought is already implied.

We find other differences too: Sometimes this "edge" is confused and closed, but sometimes it invites to us to come on in. Either way, it can come into focus more and more. If we look for the sensed quality of the edge, it can become something bodily-sensed and palpable that we "have a hold of." I call that a "felt sense." Or, we can refer to the IU only briefly, in passing. But most of the time we don't refer to our IU at all. We leave it implicit, even when there is a problem. We go from event to event and ignore what was implied but not enacted. We go from concept to concept, from what we can say to what we can say, or from one action to the next.

This is a range of very different kinds of talking and thinking. We have well replicated research of this range: palpable direct reference, touching in passing, and no direct contact with IU. We have many correlations with the differences this makes.[3] Implicit functioning is quite open to research.

There is always IU, although differently when one is not referring to it. Then IU is not an "it," although what we do is always determined by IU. We implicitly understand what we are doing, and what is happening. If the ever-present IU disappeared, we would not understand our surroundings; suddenly we would not know how and why we came to this moment. The IU is always there, but direct reference changes it. Then the next events and the ensuing process are quite different.

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[3] See Hendricks, this issue.

If we refer to the IU directly again and again for a minute or two, a few new aspects emerge, for example: “Oh, it has something to do with how it relates to that other thing.” That small step is felt as a distinct advance, and can lead to a further step, for example: “Oh, it's not just that other thing, but also this third thing.” The contents may contradict, but each step comes because direct reference is itself an event which changes the implicit many. So these hard-won new statements differ from what we can always easily say, although both are from IU. (for example: “when I went to answer the phone” and “I can't go to the store now.”)

The aspects we state from IU were not separate units before we separated them out. We could never separate them all, even if there were a finite “all.” But there cannot be. In implicit understanding there is no all. The implicit many are not a finite number. They have no separate identity.

Let us examine “separate identity:”

What has identity is “self-identical”:

Once we separate something out, it has its own identity. It becomes self-identical. It is a unit. I say it functions “as itself.” But it was not like that before we separated an “it” out. It was not a unit located in its own position in space and time.

The contrast is sharp: Something self-identical has identity conditions and its own defined pattern. It occurs in its own space-time location. Each thing is a unit. But before we separate it, calling it “it” isn't quite right. “It” does not exist and also relate to the others. The implicit many are not separate with relations to each other. Below we will see how they do function.

Existence includes the implicit:

With so much happening implicitly, of course we cannot deny that the implicit exists. Existence includes not just the single events and self-identical units, but also what functions implicitly.

It was long held that what exists must be self-identical. Since self-identicals have space and time locations, it was assumed that only what fills space and time can exist. I will argue that what exists is not only in the kind of space and time in which things are self-

identical units. There are other kinds of space and time.[4] The unit model is not all-encompassing.

To exclude the implicit from existence and from science has been a gigantic omission. Currently this is already being remedied.[5]

Implicit understanding is a crossing.

In terms of the usual concepts of self-identical units we can only say how the implicit does not function. Then it seems that the implicit cannot be studied. But we see that there is quite a lot we can say about implicit understanding. We have the many understood together, but we don't have "them" separately. Each thing we could separate is already affected by the others which it has already affected. This is an odd pattern, not the usual kind of "many." It is also a more intricate kind of "one." Let us let this more intricate pattern stand. I name it "a crossing." Rather than being side by side, each is a modification of every other. They are one implicit understanding (IU) because of the crossing. Implicit understanding is a crossing. That is how they are able to imply one actual next event, and how they can change all at once, without actually forming.[6]

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[4] *Time can be viewed as within happening, and generated by it. Happening need not be within pre-given time locations. I will discuss it further below. For a full treatment see* A Process Model, *IVB, available at www.focusing.org.*

[5] *Gallagher (2006) establishes a term ("prenoetic") that refers to the implicit. He writes: "When in the context of a game I jump to catch a ball, that action cannot be fully explained by the physiological activity of my body. The pragmatic concern of playing the game . . . even the rules of the game . . . may define how I jump. . ." (142-143)*

With just one term that refers to implicit functioning, Gallagher empowers something everyone has always known to become a source for new concepts. He writes:

*"The **prenoetic** function of the body schema . . . [is] **ordered** **according to** the intention of the actor rather than in terms of muscles or neuronal signals. . . (38) . . . the schematic adjustments . . . do **not appear as explicit parts** of the perceptual meaning, although **implicitly** they help to structure such meaning. (141) [This] is not itself a perception of . . . an object; for if it were, it would require . . . a spatial frame of reference . . . [It is a] non-perspectival awareness. (137-8) [my emphasis]*

[6] *Philosophy's "one" was always known to include the many, but those were merely its "particular" instances. We see that the one derives in and from a very different "many" which function implicitly. Their implying of the next event is a future in the present, not another linear position. Implying has no separate time-position. This is a more intricate model of time. (See A Process Model IVB.) Time is generated by implying-*

In the larger work I have formulated many characteristics of implicit functioning, more than I can take up in an article. Here I am only trying to show that we can have an explication system about concept-making and implicit functioning. But I must add one all-important characteristic:

The many–one–many process might seem as if previous events just drop out with each new event and changed implying. Not so. After single events (perceptions, cognitions) occur, they continue to function implicitly in further implying. Their effects are included in the IU from then on. But their effects are different when they are no longer self-identical. Cognitions have logical implications. They bring these with them, but now their inferences cross in the implicit many, and participate in a further result. In a crossing, the more inferences participate, the more novelty may result because each enables the others to have new effects. Implicit functioning is inference-inclusive.

We can often see the bodily novelty. Dreyfus (1972) points out that computers cannot recognize new language formations (for example, new metaphors). We come up with new phrases. People understand them but they stymie the computers. Computers embody the logical unit system which can only run through the old forms. But new forms do not come from going through the old ones.

Dreyfus cites research showing that chess masters make creative moves without deliberating. Many other examples can be cited. For example, musical improvisation is often better and more intricate than one can deliberately construct. Our bodies can implicitly employ our knowledge in new formations that we cannot deliberately construct because they don't come from rearranging the old forms.

We can now understand this with our characteristics of implicit functioning. The many possible moves that the master knows function implicitly in the coming of a new move. Their implicit functioning includes the inferences from each possible move, the logical consequences many steps ahead for both players. Thinking ahead from each move is what takes most chess players so much time to deliberate. Here we see that the implicit functioning is inference-inclusive. In the coming of the chess master's one new move, the many moves

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*occurring, the environmental interaction of body and environment. The many **imply** one event which **occurs** in the environment. Implying-occurring is body-environment interaction, as will be made clear in the next Section.*

and the inferences from each are “taken account of” without ever occurring separately. Therefore the chess master doesn't deliberate.

No old move would have been better than the new one. But being human, the master might later see a possible move that got left out. Masters do lose games especially when they play each other.

The coming of a new move is not not-logical since it takes account of the logical implications. The new move does not consist of the same units, but it is not simply something different.[7] Our familiar concepts can say this only as two denials. Let us take this more intricate pattern itself with us. I say that the implications are “carried forward” in the new occurring.

From the master's implicit understanding of the situation, the stupid moves don't come to mind for consideration. Similarly, Churchill said about Marlboro that a great military commander understands a complex situation immediately, while others understand it only after the battle.

At any stage of knowledge there are many stupid things that would never occur to us. We don't deliberate about sitting down on a wet bench, or about taking a picture into the sun. The ever-present IU is the bodily knowing. In much of life, especially your own field you may be confident of handling the next situation. You know you will “see” (i.e., understand, i.e. have an IU of) the situation. The new moves will come.

But what if nothing comes? What if our bodily knowledge is enough so no stupid moves come, but nothing else comes either? Then we need direct reference to the IU. I say more about direct reference below.

<u>Since the body implies the next move, the word “body” changes its meaning:</u>

What functions implicitly is the body. We were taught that we understand things just with the brain, but brains only work through the whole body. Elsewhere I have written at length about it.[8] Organisms encounter the environment not only with brains and perception.

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[7] Implicit functioning goes beyond the ancient pair: “the same and the different.”

[8] *See* A Process Model *and “The Implicitly Functioning Body.”*

Living bodies are environmental interactions (concretely; their very stuff is environmental) long before perception and brains develop. I will discuss this in the next Section.

Since we understand and think with the body, the meaning of the word "body" is changing. No longer does it mean just the chemicals we leave here when we die. The body is not only what is defined in physiology (or what used to be so defined.) Now "the body" means the living body functioning implicitly, both concretely and as behavior with perception and IU.

There is no distinct line between the body's implicit functioning and implicit understanding. Implicit understanding is a bodily functioning. The body's functioning seems much wider than IU. For example, toenail growth does not seem part of IU..[9]

The word "consciousness" is also changing:

IU is an implicit consciousness. We live always in implicit consciousness. So we can no longer consider "consciousness" only as the content of attention. Most of our consciousness is not something before us to which we attend. We could never attend to each thing of which we are implicitly conscious. Implicit understanding (IU) is an implicit kind of reflection.

We are definitely not unconscious of our IU. If it suddenly disappeared we would be horribly disoriented, not know what we're doing or how we came here. So the word "consciousness" also expands its meaning here.[10]

Our two systems are clear. We can keep our existing concepts with their explicit logic, and also have another system in which we study explication, processes of implying-occurring, and the role of implicit functioning in generating something new, including new concepts.

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[9] *Once we separate a process (and specify it with our instruments), it may seem not to be in IU. But except when we separate something, there is no line. Implicit functioning does not consist of the separated processes. Psychosomatic medicine also shows that behavior and thought are whole-body process.*

[10] *We also re-understand the words "proprioceptive" or "kinaesthetic." "Proprioceptive" meant sensing one's muscles; "kinaesthetic" meant sensing one's motion. In common use both words confusingly also meant the IU, since there was no word for IU. It seems hard to believe that there has not been even a word for it!*

II. FIRST PERSON PROCESS IS BODY-ENVIRONMENT INTERACTION.

I will trace how the current distinction between third and first person originated. I argue that it is derived, not a given. I will derive it. The derivation will also establish a genuine ground for the objectivity of scientific concepts.

First I will give some examples of direct reference and carrying forward. Then I will try to show that the implying-occurring process is environmental interaction.

I said that if no new move comes, one needs direct reference to the IU. As we have seen, in the chess example, new moves can come directly from the bodily knowing of IU, without direct reference. Direct reference generates a different process, small steps of carrying forward, and eventually a large step. They come from the palpable sense brought by directly referring. It is the sense of what was implied but could not be enacted (including the "edge," the "understanding" what we didn't understand).

There are occasions when everyone has a felt sense. When someone did not understand what we said, we rephrase it. We do that by referring directly to what we meant ("Let me see, what was I trying to say?"). We separate "it" from just these words. From the separation alternative words come. Let us notice that they come from the separation. We will see this again as we proceed. The separation is the effect of referring directly to the implicit as such.

Another such occasion is when we have forgotten what we were about to say. It happens, for example, when others are speaking and we wait for the chance to say it. By the time the others have stopped talking we have "lost hold of" it. Now we search for what we lost. The readiness to speak was a cluster of implicit statements that had never actually formed. We search for "it" to come back. "What was I going to say?" We refer directly to our bodily sense of it while it isn't yet there, so that it can return, and the words can come from it.

Sometimes it comes of its own accord., but we must refer to it to let it come more into focus. For example: Suppose you have an oddly gnawing feeling. It is . . . . . , a bodily sense. Then you realize it's that you were supposed to do something today -- it's now Monday afternoon -- what was it? You don't know, and yet it is there, in that gnawing body-tension.

You think of many things you ought to have done today, perhaps very necessary things, but no; none of them are "it." How do you know that none of these is what you forgot? The gnawing knows. It won't release. You burrow into this gnawing. Then suddenly -- you remember: Yes, someone was waiting for you for lunch. Too late now! This might make you quite tense. But what about the gnawing? That particular tension has eased. There are also outward indications of remembering, for example your apologetic phone call.

Now this . . . . . no longer hangs there. Why not? Because it was the implying of moves that have now occurred. Of course the . . . . . did not already contain this move. But the coming of the . . . . . carried forward the whole body forward so that new moves could come.

Quite new things I myself don't know yet can come in the same way.

Why is it possible to “know” what we cannot yet think? How was it possible for the “. . . . . “ to hang there until I got it right, as if it knew what I did not know. What is bodily knowledge? I must now show that bodily knowledge is not something inside, it is body-environment interaction.

All body process IS environmental interaction:

All organisms ***are*** environmental interaction through and through. Every cell ***is*** an interaction with its environment within the body, and the whole body is an environmental interaction. It consists of interactional environmental stuff. The organismic implying-occurring is carried forward in the environment. ***The body implies environmental interactions.*** ***The next event is always an environmental event.*** The body is concretely ongoing “knowledge” of the environment, not as representation but as interaction.

The body implies behavior space:

Animals not only ***are*** environmental interactions; animals also ***have*** the environment. Our animal bodies generate the perceived environment of objects. Our bodies imply possibilities of behavior with objects (what Gibson called “affordables”). The objects are spread side by side but the behavior possibilities are not side by side. Any one behavior changes the other possibilities, whether and how the others could still happen. This crossed

cluster constitutes a "space." The body implies the objects and behavior possibilities as a single perceived "behavior-space."

Behavior is inherently conscious. A behavior stops the moment the body's implying was not enacted (carried forward) in the environment. The bodily-felt effect of environmental carrying forward continues the formation of a behavior sequence. Its forming depends both on the perception and on its felt effect. Therefore behavior forms consciously. Animals feel what they are doing. Rather than saying that we are "conscious of" behavior; we should say that formation of behavior generates consciousness.[11]

The human behavior context includes speech possibilities. Any one behavior or statement carries forward the whole context of behavior and speech possibilities.

With certain special characteristics, behavior and speech are bodily carrying-forward processes.

Human bodies imply patterns as patterns:

Speech consists of patterns that are only sounds. Visual patterns can be seen quite separately from patterns that are only heard, and we can hear sound patterns separately from what we see. The human capacity to see patterns not as things but just as patterns is what separates the five senses.

Humans can perceive a pictured cat as the mere visual pattern of a cat on a piece of cardboard. Dogs cannot do both. They will either push the cardboard around, or growl at the cat. The dog sees the patterns on the things but not as patterns, only as the thing with which it behaves. Of course we humans also see the things with which we behave, but our behavior context implicitly includes the separable patterns as well. So we see things both as behavior objects and in separable patterns of things, an ability that is an essentially human development.[12]

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[11] *See* A Process Model, *VI.*

[12] *See A Process Model VIIA for the derivation of the "of" and the human pattern responding.*

We can be misled if we assume that perception happens only through the separated senses. A visual pattern may be the only incoming perception just now. The body implies the behavior context, the space of behavior possibilities with objects in all five senses.[13]

I will soon present reasons for the objectivity and rightness of the conceptual map of self-identical unit-objects, but it cannot remain our only kind of explanation. Let me first ask: How does the conceptual map of self-identical units come to be? My answer is that we make it in the separated patterns of things.

How humans make patterned units in the patterns of things:

We divide things into parts and re-combine the parts to make other things. (Animals make many things, e.g., nests and spider webs, but they rarely divide and combine.) Many different things can be made and explained from the same parts. When we divide into small enough parts, we can explain many things by showing that they all consist of the same set of fixed parts. When we divide things we consider them in their patterns. What we divide is the pattern.

To combine the parts we need them to remain stable while we are putting them together. We keep them the same. As we make more complex parts, we preserve our procedure for dividing and making parts. That makes our parts repeatable.

As we saw earlier, in the unit model it is a big problem to explain novelty and concept-change. In the explication system how something stable comes about needs explaining, since the concrete body is always a fresh crossing. The more factors come into inference-inclusive implicit functioning, the more novelty. We need to see how units that stay the same are made in our patterns.

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[13] See A Process Model, VIIA, where this has been carefully derived. See also my "The Implicitly Functioning Body." A*lthough we can prove that purely visual triangles excite some butterflies more than the irregular triangles a sexual partner exhibits, the butterfly's body implies behavior possibilities not with visual triangles but with another butterfly, -- in all five senses. Even if only visual perceptions are coming in at the moment, the body always implies behavior possibilities with the thing. If behavior is now forming with just one sense coming in, then if another sense becomes active, its input joins the ongoing behavior formation. This explains the "intermodality" Gallagher (2006) has presented..*

The patterns perceived as pattern form a network of their own relations to each other. This is our conceptual map. We design our machines and their parts on the conceptual map, but we combine the parts and build the machines in our behavior space. Behavior space is also where we test what we built. Testing happens in environmental interaction directly. That is why the results can differ from what we infer. The behavior context is wider; the operations happen within it. But it can seem as if the operations happen within the space of the conceptual map.

Similarly, the chess master moves from the wider behavior context within which the known moves and rules of chess function. But it can seem as if the move happens within the conceptual system of chess, and it's beside the point that a person is moving the piece. The basketball player jumps in accord with the rules of the game which function implicitly within the body's environmental interaction. Why does behavior seem to happen within the space of the conceptual map?

The jumps come in the player's behavior space, first person process. But we explain them in the conceptual space of relations among patterns, the third person perspective.

So far we needn't be puzzled or misled. It is quite clear in which respects each system is the wider. In action (and for new moves and new concepts) the third person perspective happens within the first person process. In existing explanations, the first person process happens within the third person perspective. But now we have to consider a further aspect of the third person perspective which can mislead us.

Moving patterns generate empty space:

Humans can move just the pattern from one thing to another and another. We take a pattern from a thing that has it, and move it to cardboard, wood or steel. Humans make things by moving patterns. We are homo faber.

When the same pattern is moved from one thing onto another and another, the pattern ignores all the characteristics of the thing that had the pattern, as well as all the characteristics of the thing onto which we moved it. It is the same pattern and the same parts in both places, regardless of what else the recipients may be. The pattern is considered the “universal;” the things become its mere “particulars.” Nothing changes but locations. Moving patterns

generate a space of locations, points. As far as the moving patterns are concerned, the space is empty. The things are merely locations, filling the empty space at certain points.

The space made by moving patterns is the space of what we call "motion," not behavior, not action, just motion. Motion is a change just in locations, from one point to another point in a location-space in which the patterns move.

In modern physics this empty space of motion-locations has not been the conceptual map for more than a century. Many kinds of spaces have been employed. But empty location space continues to be assumed in all the other sciences. There is much puzzlement over the fact that we have more than one conceptual map and kind of space. With explication we see how more than one is possible because conceptual systems (and spaces) exist within the implicit–explicit body-environment interaction. Only in regard to the explanation does environmental interaction seem to happen within (one or another) conceptual system.

The empty space of mere motion is first created when humans move patterns to make things. Pattern-space makes mere motion seem basic. But behavior is prior to motion by billions of years. We make wonderful things by considering things in motion space. But we are misled if we explain the body, behavior and perception only within the empty space of motion.

Motion space separates itself, and separates everything else from itself:

When what we see, touch, or hear is conceptualized as motion, the motion separates itself from what comes with it in the behavior. Instead of behavior in behavior space, motion seems to happen in the space of pattern locations, a separate, empty "external" space. What it cuts away from itself now seems separable. This is how motion space separates itself, and separates everything else from itself.

If we observe through the concepts (the pattern) in the space of their motion, we seem to observe only what the motion produces. That splits the behavioral effect into observable and unobservable segments. The body-environment interaction is divided so that the observed segment seems external. The rest has to be considered "internal." Both the external and the internal are products of motion space. The environment (including environmental

interaction) seems to be an “external” space of pattern-relations. The perceived behavior space disappears from view. It seems to be inside the body.

For example, consider an animal running away from a predator. If it has gotten far enough away we have to say that it does not perceive the predator behind it. So we have to say that the predator is now being “imagined,” or “remembered,” something internal not perceived by the sense organs. But this is a secondary distinction, not how bodies exist in the environment. The predator is obviously still in the perceived space of behavior possibilities. The animal would not, but could turn and go toward the predator. It runs from something that is actually there and perceivable in the body's space of environmental interaction. Distancing the predator generates the running and is carried forward by every tree that whizzes by the animal. The running, and the perceived trees carry forward the behavior space which includes the predator.

Quite similarly, it is assumed that we don't perceive the space behind us. But it is part of our presently perceived behavior space. We sense where we could now turn and go. We would be quite startled if we suddenly perceived an absence back there, an abyss of nothingness. The space behind us doesn't drop away as we move. It is always part of our perceived space.

<u>We have derived the external and the internal. They are not givens:</u>

When we seem to observe only the simple location-changing motions, the empty space of location points becomes the “external” space, making everything else seem to disappear into an “internal.”

<u>Motion space splits body from “mind”:</u>

If “the body” is considered in motion space, an externalized body seems split off from the body in environmental interaction. The left-over becomes “the mind.” Then it seems hidden, “internal.” I argue to the contrary, that the motion space (and the separate sensations and their objects) exist within behavior space in the body-environment interaction. The analysis in motion space is immensely valuable and objective, as I will further show, but it

must be considered within behavior space. Behavior and environmental interaction don't happen within "external" motion space.

The merely external body is a product of splitting motion from behavior. We need not uncritically assume the external and internal as givens. They are both products from the more original human activity of making things and unit parts. The activity that produces external and internal spaces is not itself in external or internal space. Both occur only within the body's environmental interaction.

The objectivity of our concepts:

Why does nature confirm the results we predict from our latest operations? Elsewhere[14] I have shown that our concepts have a kind of objectivity which is still largely misunderstood. Our concepts are truly the patterns of the things, because the things reveal their patterns on our patterns. Seen through our patterns, they cast their profile -- their patterns on ours. That is why our analyses are "objective," really about the things, even though they are our patterns. The patterns (including the external space) happen within environmental interaction when we make and test our machines. When it was not understood that we test operations in environmental interaction, it was the great puzzle of Western philosophy why nature upholds our concepts. Malbranche said that thought and nature were like two clocks that show the same time. The current assumption of "correspondence" and "representation" is not far different. That problematic epistemology has been endlessly criticized, but there has been no alternative.

One assumed that nature really consists of the unit parts we have made – this year. Supposedly we approach ever closer to representing the one set of nature's unit parts; we were just wrong last year. But I argue that we were not just wrong. We would still obtain the result we predicted last year, if we performed the old operations with the old equipment. But this year we can build and do more, and predict the outcomes of more complex operations.[15]

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[14] *See "The Responsive Order."*

[15] *See Crease, R., Scientists play in the lab till they do something that has some regular result. "If we do x we get y" creates an "it." Then attributes belong to it. Focusing Folio .See also his The Play of Nature.*

Studying the body purely in motion-pattern space results in medical cures. The computers we design in conceptual motion space really work, and the airplanes really fly. The results of analysis are not "only" constructions. The Postmodernists were wrong to deny the objectivity of scientific concepts (especially when they wrote this on computers, and took airplanes to conventions to say it). Their real contribution was loosening the representational assumptions. But since they saw no alternative; they glorified "limbo." We see exactly how logic builds the world further, and how logical consequences add to implicit understanding. We see why our two systems must be kept apart, and also how they relate.

It does not take away from the objectivity of concepts that they came from implying–occurring-implying. On the contrary, we can explain their objectivity within the explication system we are developing. But their interrelations cannot alone supply the model of nature and other processes. Therefore we need not only unit concepts. We can make what I call "process concepts," some of them directly about the implying–occurring-implying process, many more about various kinds of organismic events. In the next chapter I will discuss how this affects research.

<u>The first person process is not a "perspective:"</u>

1st person process has been widely misunderstood as being inside the externalized body. I have tried to show that first person process is not within something externally observed; it is rather the body-environment interaction within which we explicate observations and conceptual systems.

The usual view assumes an unbridgeable gap between 1st and 3rd person "perspectives." But a perspective is something observed. Only 3rd person is a perspective, the "view from nowhere," the observed reified without the observer. Perspectives split observer and observed. The 1st person process is not something observed, nor is it an observer.

But if first person process is understood from first person process, we can explicate how it is bodily, inherently reflective, carrying itself forward, thereby implicitly conscious, always an implicit understanding, needing no added observer. Everyone is a 1st person process, but we may need training to refer directly to it.

The training is discussed in the next Section. Then Section V concerns working in a theoretical or research field when we sense what could become a new concept but cannot be formulated in the current terms of the field.

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III. TRAINING AND NEW TERRITORIES

Training:

We are now training people in direct reference, and also just to find even the passing contact with IU. We can measure how well these were learned. What people can tell us with training is of course not what was there before. It comes newly from IU. But now we can study this "carrying forward" itself.

To study what actually happens we have to train people to refer and speak from what they find, so they can tell us. But we don't need to trust their reports. Talking is not only about something; talking is behavior. "Description" is not one thing. It comes in the range from palpable direct reference to reference in passing and no direct reference, three kinds of talking.

If we ask subjects to describe what happened when we administered our measure, we may be shocked. We may discover totally unsuspected variables. We can then measure them directly. External indices can be found for any experience. External and internal are not given divided.

Researchers need to refer directly to their own IU. Administering the measure to oneself quickly reveals what the measure does and doesn't really measure. This is also needed to choose a measure. For example, if one hypothesizes a correlation with anxiety, just choosing some available measure of "anxiety" isn't sufficient. Without taking the measure oneself, one cannot find out if it measures the kind of "anxiety" one assumes in one's hypothesis. Anxiety isn't one thing either.

In current research there is a tendency just to assume that some unit event corresponds to one's word or concept, and that one's measure taps that. But just the concept and the

intention to measure it isn't enough. One needs independent indices of what actually happens, so that one can control for it.

Researchers often assume that operational variables must come from what are already external observations. But if we refer directly to IU, we can distinguish many variables and distinctions which can then be externally defined and quantitatively measured. Without direct reference these variables will never be found.

Direct reference can also save one from designing arbitrary measures that have no hope of success. For example, in one study ordinary dream reports were compared with reports from survivors of sexual abuse. No differences were found. The measure was the frequency of 100 common words. But someone familiar with abuse victims could recognize phrases such as “didn't believe me.” Random words and measures don't correlate when they lack an experiential relation to what one wants to measure. For example, remembering meaningless syllables may not be the kind of memory process one wanted to measure. A “preference” between a lovely and an ugly images might not be the same process as between two equally attractive ones. If one had only some moments for “the preference,” one might well not remember which of two similar images one chose. If subjects have forgotten which image they chose, obviously the reasons they give for the preference cannot be a “remembering.” It must be a fresh finding. One needs indices to control for these distinctions.

Once identified, new variables will have externally definable indices. It is certainly not more “objective” to lack distinctions and variables just because they would first have to be found by direct reference.

There is now an international network of training (www. focusing.org). We teach two practices, each with precise steps. “Focusing” teaches referring to the implicit. It has many uses in many fields. In the next section I discuss the second: “TAE” (“Thinking At the Edge”) teaches thinking and concept formation.

Focusing instructions came from the finding that clients who began low didn't move up on the range of contact with IU. We had thought we observed all clients moving up. Only the numbers denied it. (Currently focusing instructions are integrated into many approaches

to therapy.) In that quantitative research the variable was first found by direct reference, but of course it had externally observable indices which could be quantified.

Direct reference opens many different territories:

Direct reference opens quite a large field. I call it a "territory of territories." People sometimes want this huge territory to be all one thing, but that would confuse different territories.

Many advances have been made and new field have been created. They need to be collected, interrelated, and evaluated. We need a new Bacon to create a public science from them.[16]

Focusing, TAE, and concept formation are only one such territory. Some others are already distinct as well. For example, meditation, autogenic training, deep relaxation, and hypnosis are another territory. Still others are Feldenkreis, hands-on body work, and movement. I don't know enough to classify. Even within one field the specialties may utterly differ.

The relationship to IU can differ greatly. For example, in one kind of meditation we merely observe what "comes up." This opens a different territory than focusing does. In focusing we don't only let things "come up the stairs" (and then dissolve). We similarly welcome the feelings without identifying with them, but we "go down the stairs" to the murky edge where a new felt sense of "all that" can come. We enter and go a few steps, or many. The relaxation is not nearly as deep.

In focusing the felt sense brings a larger and stronger kind of "I" in a new kind of space. "I" am here; the felt sense and my whole situation is over there. In contrast, some kinds of meditation can bring an "absence of self." But meditation can also build resilience in the face of whatever comes. There are many different territories, and no reason to lose any of them.

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[16] *See my "First Person Science" (with Johnson, D.*

Body sensations are not all of one kind:

What we refer to may at first seem just bodily, "just" the physical discomfort, excitement, or nameless physical quality. But soon one senses it is implicitly complex. A beginner might ask: "Is this a felt sense or just indigestion?" Either is possible in the same location, but implicitly they exist very differently.

Of course we want to analyze these experiences just as we analyze speech on an oscilloscope. Every analytic advance makes further advances in IU possible. But a given instrument may or may not define what happens.

We must not treat the bodily sensations like the old reductive physiology did. We must not cut them off from the IU if they carry it. We may describe them in the same words at first, but that does not make them "just physical sensations." We must also guard against dividing them in advance under the current units and categories. The intricacy of what happens need not fit under current units. If these factors are considered, the very new work on bodily variables in direct reference may well provide an entirely new analyses of the body.

IV. TRAINING IN CONCEPT FORMATION

In theoretical and research situations it pays to keep track of what we sense but cannot yet conceptualize. Of course you want to do that, I argue. My usual example: If your lab assistant reports that the equipment is acting funny today, would you ignore it? Or, if you are the one who notices, would you ignore what isn't clear?

One doesn't want to be the kind of scientist or philosopher who ignores unclear edges and reports only what is already well known. But to notice more one must often enter a murky physical feeling which may not seem promising at first.

We may live for years with knowing more than we have been able to tell ourselves or our colleagues. But when we can let a felt sense come, we can become quite excited long before we can speak from it.

Why is the implicit edge of a problem sometimes so exciting? The coming of a felt sense is a bodily event in which a great many implicit statements that have not been made, have all just been carried forward. Of course that can be bodily exciting.

And, why is explicating such an edge even more exciting? The explication creates a whole field in which we can do and make new things and create new analyses. That is so much more, and we still have the felt sense (now carried forward) as well.

Our second training (assuming one knows focusing) is designed for people who are tracking something they sense, but have been unable to say. This is usually because it involves a pattern that cannot be subdivided into self-identical parts like the usual concepts can. We call it "TAE," Thinking At the Edge. It is a "method," but with direct reference a "method" once learned, generates new and different ways from one's IU. With the first eight of our steps, people become able to say it. They report telling about it everywhere, both at length and briefly, in common and fancy words.

Many people report an exciting discovery: "I can think!" What most of us learned in school was not thinking. We learned to use already-formed concepts without our own IU.

Then, if one wants a formal theory there are more steps I will discuss below. The fourteen steps and an Introduction are available at www.focusing.org. Here I only want to mention a few points.

Partnership helps one say what one didn't know:

Along with focusing we teach a "listening" which lets each thing be, so that there is room to refer to and await the felt sense behind it. In TAE we have a partner who listens in this way and writes down what we say verbatim. We need this because the precision of the new phrases that come is so quickly forgotten.

Why facets (particular events) are necessary:

TAE requires at least one actual instance of what we are trying to say. (Later on we need four or five more.) It is called a "facet," anything that actually happened and has the hue of what one is tracking. People often want to start with a general memory. They say, "It happened many times," but TAE requires recalling an occasion. For example, someone writes: "I'm satisfied with what I say when my words match my experience." The word "match" will derail any further thinking because it assumes the old representational model. Later, when we can separate what we mean from the old way of saying it, we can refer

directly the facet. From referring directly the no longer misnamed “matching” and see how it was on that real occasion. Then new phrases come and can lead to new concepts.

Why words won't do; phrases are necessary:

We often think something new, but our old words bring the old meanings to everyone else. Only new phrases can bring the new meaning. Even if they don't understand, people notice that something new is being said.

A way to get metaphorical phrases when none come:

At one stage in our TAE we use a simple way to get new phrases to come. The new meaning is usually immersed in old statements and concepts. How can we separate it out? Write a sentence however insufficient. By looking up a major word (like “match” in the above example) in the dictionary, we vividly discover that it doesn't mean what we intended. Then we ask -- very gently -- “What did you want that word to mean?”

Another word may come. Looking it up leads us to reject it as well. And so with a third. We see that every word says much that we didn't want it to mean. By replacing one after the other, the words have made what I call a “slot” in the sentence. If we say the sentence with the slot left empty (for example, if we put a hand-gesture or a “ . . . ”), then the sentence does seem oddly close to saying what we mean.

Once the slot works, it can do more. Now the slot can change what the words mean, if we put them back (but only for us and only for now). Each word has a different new meaning because its old meaning crosses with the slot. Now the new meaning won't be lost with further words about it. They will all cross with it and change.[17]

Now, if we invite phrases, new metaphorical phrases come easily to say what each word now means. Why easily? Because now what we directly refer to no longer implies the old phrases.

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[17] *I call this “**reversal**.” A new meaning (or the new pattern implicit in it) can cross and apply also to major topics, for example “biology,” “evolution,” “human nature,” “nature,” “beauty,” or “value.” Instead of being subsumed under the large old topic, the new pattern provides a new way to think about biology, or evolution, human nature, etc. A new pattern can bring the large topic a new possibility which could not be seen from the unit model.*

Building a theory:

About building a logical theory from direct reference, let me state the principle in a compressed paragraph. We can phrase many distinct "terms" from a felt sense. Each of these terms instances that felt sense. Through the felt sense the terms are implicitly connected. When we see the new pattern, it can be stated in three or four terms. We can write a definition for each of these terms by using the other terms in the pattern. Then we can also write a definition for every other term, always using the already-defined terms and the pattern. Now there are logical connections between the terms, which explicate the implicit connections the already had. We can develop their definitions (and sometimes introduce an intervening term) by asking about any two of them: "How does this term inherently involves what the other term is? And how does the other inherently involve what this one is?" We call this "the inherence question." We answer this by understanding their meaning from the felt sense. They both imply this one felt sense, hence they imply each other. We retroactively make logically connected definitions of discrete terms that were originally implicit in one felt sense. Now they are still inherently connected implicitly but also by the logic.

In any context, a retroactive logic can always be explicated from implicit functioning, if we want it. It is always already implicit. The strands from one felt sense can have their implicit connection explicated with logically connected definitions.

The theory can now give a new statement on any topic by crossing our pattern with terms of that topic (See footnote 16). It can also develop further and further into our specialty field. The theory can indicate where intervening steps are missing and, if we know enough, it can derive them. In its own field the theory develops further and further.

Once formulated, we can use the theory without directly referring Of course we also still have the (much carried forward) felt sense. That allows us to go further whenever we want. It also lets us create a second terminology, which we may want for various reasons. That doesn't mean terminology is no longer crucial. On the contrary: different terminologies let us see different aspects. But with direct reference to implicit understanding "terminology" no longer means just formed forms in empty space.

In the next Section I discuss why phrases can change the meaning of the words, and why we human beings are normally so distant from our own IU, that we need training to reach it to directly.

V. TWO KINDS OF SPEECH

Why do we need training? Why don't we always speak and act directly from what our whole IU implies? This is because human bodies imply a cultural system of sayings and doings which can capture us. Then the IU still functions, but only to determine which cultural thing we say or do. Please notice: I am not saying that this system must captures us, only that it can and often does. But according to most current theories what I call “capture” is the inherent nature of language. I deny it. I will show how the IU can be captured – but need not be.

Many children close their IU between the ages of six and ten. Small children have empathy with all children and animals. Later they have none for children and animals whom the culture rejects.

Many people cannot easily feel more than the cultural situation. For example, a man's brother died. You ask him what he feels and he says “sad.” You ask for more and he says “I am mourning him.” You ask him what his brother's death means to him, and he answers “Well, what are you asking me? My brother died. How would you feel if your brother died?”

Some rituals may also be bodily important to people although they have only the cultural explanation for them. But most people have elaborated the system well beyond what the culture itself offers, and can immediately tell you about that. Contact with the IU directly is more difficult. Let me first explain why the human body implies the cultural system.

Human bodies imply behavior with speech possibilities. Most human behavior is speech, and all human behavior involves implicit speech. In humans the behavior context is called the “situation.” We have just seen that the bodily-implied behavior context – the situation – is not external nor is it internal. Situations are our our bodily-implied behavior contexts, now always including at least implicit speech. Language is not a separated system of mere words, rather our bodily living.

Let me ask: How do words come to us to say? I open my mouth and they come. They come already organized, to say what I want to say. And just these words come without my having to consider all the other possible words.

We can observe that the coming of words is a bodily process, that it includes arranging the words in phrases and sentences, and that this organizing arises from the present situation.

We also see that "a situation" is something the body has. We need not puzzle why the words say what I need to say in the situation, since a "situation" is the bodily implied behavior possibilities.

We can now explain the bodily way words come. It's because a "situations" is the bodily behavior context of possible next moves, largely speech. But the human behavior context also includes the cultural system of kinds of situations with their cultural doings and sayings.

We don't "symbolize" by attaching "signifiers" to external things. Situations don't first exist and are then "signified." Implicit language already structures every situation through the body. Explication replaces the old relation of "signifier and signified." Symbols are not a separate system of conventional tags. Language is part of how cultural situations developed.

We rarely speak directly from our own IU because our behavior context implies an elaborate system of already-formed sayings. I will show why going beyond this system has seemed impossible. Then I will show why something new can come to say directly from implicit understanding (IU), (with the old sayings functioning implicitly like old chess moves).

It can seem, quite wrongly, that we are trapped by the words.

<u>Always the same words:</u>

It is true that we have always only the same old words of the language. Occasionally we add a word from another language, or we combine words or their syllables. Otherwise we must always use the same old words.

Words are understood by recognition. Even if we see or hear part of it, we recognize the whole word. A merely similar sound or shape brings us no meaning at all. Each word has

its uses, its own meanings in certain kinds of situations. The culture teaches kinds of situations and word-uses. Each kind is a bundle of stories, scenarios, alternative possible actions and sayings.

Even if we want to say something directly from our own more intricate situation, it seems we cannot. The words say their own standard meanings instead. Language is "discursive." The words bring their own story and carry that story forward. We can only hope that our words will also, indirectly, as a by-product, carry forward the situation in which we are actually living. Language seems never to say as much as our own situation would imply, sometimes not even anything like it.

Elsewhere I quoted a man who said: "Where I grew up, no matter what I felt, it had to be one of two or three things." Then he said "If there is another way to talk, I want it!" That man keenly felt how much more his own situation implied.

Currently most philosophers say that there is no other way. Words can only say what they mean. What we meant is lost, and language is blamed. They say that language can only be discursive. I deny it. There is another way:

<u>How language can say something new. Three remarkable facts:</u>

A word has many uses; a phrase may have just one use.

Words usually come already all arranged in phrases. A phrase belongs to a situation; it comes at a specific juncture, now.[18]

A new phrase can give its words new meanings. It is always the phrase that determines which of the word's uses obtains. In a new situation a new phrase gives the words a new use and meaning.

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[18] *How words come in phrases (old or new) involves four considerations at once. Syntactically the words bring their possible relations to all other words and kinds of words (adjectives, verbs, nouns, etc.). Pragmatically they bring their uses which function implicitly to let just this use emerge. Thirdly these two crossings must cross because without the syntax they cannot say this rather than something else. Fourthly, what comes must belong to our own situation just now. Our situation determines which use of the words obtains, and to what they now apply. I will say more about this fourth one later. Philosophers have distinguished syntactic from pragmatic, but have only recently wondered how they happen in one occurring (Goldberg et al, 2007. See also my "Crossing and Dipping" and "Replay to Mark Johnson.") missing in the bibliography*

Usually no new phrase comes because we don't speak from direct reference to the IU of our own situation, and our own thought. At the edge of theoretical thought also, we don't usually wait for what I called “the edge” to come to us as a palpable something, nor even in passing. We move from one already-formed concept to another. And even when we directly sense the edge, we don't let a new phrase form. People assume they must use old phrases.

New phrases may take some moments to form. At the moment only old ones may seem to be there. One needs to notice what the old ones don't say.

Wittgenstein demonstrated that the same word could have new meanings in new uses. He invented situations to show this (for example, many new meanings of the word “reading.”) He didn't explain it. He only wanted to show that meaning depends on use. He said he was not telling, “only showing.” He did not explain what is involved in “only showing.” He didn't theorize because he was sure that any talk about language must use the old phrases and lose what he was showing.[19]

My philosophy goes beyond this. Talking about language need not be in old phrases. New phrases can come also when we theorize about language, as we are doing here. But Wittgenstein was right that new meanings cannot be said in old sayings.

Why is the cultural system always implied? We speak of kinds of things and kinds of circumstances, already conceptualized and unitized. All our doings are defined by words and gestures like signing papers and earning money. Situations and behavior come in kinds defined by their implicit speech and ritual. Our own situation is always more intricate. The standard sayings and speech-defined doings have always already functioned, but (like the old chess

moves) they don't form and don't come when we speak directly from IU and new phrases come directly from IU.

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[19] S*ee “What Happens When Wittgenstein Asks 'What Happens When?' ” Philosophical Forum XXVIII. 3, Spring 1997 and Translated in H.J. Schneider & M. Kross (Hgg.), Mit Sprache spielen. 1999. Berlin: Akademie.*

To refer directly and let speech form in this way is a learned skill for most people but it can be done at any point. Then we always notice that what our situation implies is much more intricate and differentiated than the cultural kinds.

The usual view is mistaken, that the individual only chooses among the cultural scenarios, or adds mere “nuances.” Since what is culturally appropriate has only the cultural meaning, therefore the so-called "nuances" actually tell us much more. They are not mere detail. They indicate what the saying means here, from this person. Of course we will know much more if the person will directly refer to that meaning, and speak from there.

Speech coming directly from IU is trans-cultural. The individual far transcends culture. This becomes much more evident with direct reference. We train people in many cultures. My work with individuals in Japan is just like my work with people here. A man briefly describes the role of Japanese fathers at some festival. He takes me across the culture just at that one spot. Then I perfectly understand his pain from his father's neglect at that festival. and always. Of course I understand only him, not the culture. During group activities I am utterly lost. I keep my hands by my side. Even if it seems obvious, I know that I don't really know what's going on.[20]

Both old and new are implied:

Both old and new are always implicit and implied-next. If new phrases come, the old ones functioned implicitly. If old phrases come, our present IU determined which old saying came, why it comes, and what it actually means in this situation here.

We can speak directly from a new IU with direct reference to it, and a slight pause to enable new phrases come from it. By using words demonstratively, the implicit can be directly had and its own language-implying can form. Usually it would be lost.

But conditions and views are changing. It is becoming easier and more prevalent to refer to our IU. Individuals have developed far beyond the cultural roles and kinds. What a culture gives us hardly ever works for us to meet our situations. The culturally defined role

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[20] *Culture deeply structures the body. One's culture is recognizable by posture, style of movement, and much else. Rather than elaborating behavior, human behavior happens within the culture. (See A Process Model, VIIB.) Culture is deep and unavoidable, but communication from implicit understanding renders it almost trivial.*

behavior has become utterly inadequate. We innovate all day. There is more and more need for language to come in new meanings from implicit understanding.

We can see the development of a society in which people live from implicit understanding (IU) and recognize that others do. Then society won't waste as much of what a human being can be. Already we are learning the difference between disconnected and IU-connected talking and telling. It is being recognized that there is always novelty, and that positive new steps and healing can come from the implicit if we can be in direct contact with it and let it carry us forward.

Currently most of society's efforts fail to improve schools, churches, jails, businesses, and policy planning. Many good efforts don't reach what is implicitly happening in people. We find that if a person is taught to refer directly to IU as in focusing, then social efforts reach there where they can connect with implicit functioning and make a real difference. Children are excited to discover where in them fresh thinking can happen. Violent jail inmates no longer just act out, when they discover what is implicit in their intolerable rage. “Each time it's something different!” they report. Business people discover that in a small group or one to one they can say what they themselves never heard before.

Most importantly we live more deeply. This is not to deny that the new ways we find might miss much, so that we go horribly wrong. Sometimes the new developments make old ways of coping impossible without supplying enough new ones. Focusing is by no means the only skill we need to learn. We need to develop along many other avenues, but focusing does make the instruction in other avenues more effective.

VI. THE CHANGED GROUND

<u>The two models contrasted:</u>

In the unit model existence is thought of as one-one-one, just occurring-occurring-occurring. Each event is discretely formed. In the explication model events are also implicit intricacies with a more intricate continuity. Discrete events exist within the process of body-environment interaction, not only in empty space.

The unit model generates an “external” space, a viewed space. Environmental interaction is viewed as motions. The body seems to consist of views from the outside. The organism's next-implying seems “inside” the externally-viewed body. First person process is viewed as “internal,” “subjective.”

Consciousness is cut away and seems to be a separated unit thing. But this thing-consciousness can never be added to logical concepts, since their inferences depend on their working alone, without what is cut away. But consciousness cannot be understood as a separate thing.

In the old model our concepts seemed to be “representations” of the units in nature. They seemed to need “corresponding” entities in an “external” reality. Representation was supposed to relate knowledge to the environment.

There is no question that logically related concepts explain things and let us build machines and technology. But something goes wrong when this view is made into the overall model. Then the universe seems to be the empty space of mere views, and we seem to exist inside a body that consists of external views.

This famously questionable ground of science has been criticized for centuries but there was no alternative. But now that we are developing the explication model, we can completely shift this shaky ground. The logical unit model famously cannot establish its own ground and objectivity. The objectivity of concepts can be established in an explication system about the formation and testing in implicitly functioning environmental interaction.

Which of the two models can include both? The explication model can let us think about itself as well about the formation and objectivity of the unit model. It can show how the two models expand each other.

“First person” is not a “perspective;” only “third person” is a “perspective.” A “perspective” is a view, even if nothing is said about whose view it is. First person process has been misunderstood as if it existed within the 3rd person perspective in which everything is just a a view. But the two systems are not two of a kind. The third person analysis is a product of explication within the first person process which is the environmental interaction to which you can directly refer. From first person process we explicate concepts, including of course the concepts I presented here. (People will soon make better and better such concepts).

The reciprocity of the two models:

Logic depends on keeping the units the same. Therefore it can never explain how new thoughts come. In contrast, explication freshly "carries forward" at every step. Therefore it can never have the inferential power of logical formation. We can see clearly that neither system can undercut or minimize the other.

We have to let our concepts have their own inferences. These can lead us to new places, new interactions with the environment. There we look around. What the computer did might have been too complex for our IU to follow, but we surely inspect the result. Then our understanding may include what the computer cannot follow. The implicit links in our IU are capable of retroactive logical explication, and sometimes building new computers.

What we study and test in interaction must never be assumed to consist only of the conceptual inferences that led us to it. It is a false metaphysics which has been teaching students to assume that a natural thing or a human research subject is nothing but the units of the current science system.

The reciprocity of the two systems has always gone on, but there was no wider system in which to employ it systematically. Now there is. Many advantages are gained for analysis if the wider system is available. New concepts and new units can be generated and tried at any point.

Empirical testing:

A change in our unit system must satisfy certain criteria. Empirical testing is vital but we cannot test concepts as such. We test our operations. We test the outcomes of what we do, especially operations with machines and instruments. We test operations directly in the implicit intricacy of nature. That is why we always get more findings than our hypotheses projected, never only what confirms or disconfirms them. What we do and find increases our IU so that new concepts come and we can build new instruments and do still more.

Empirical testing requires replication by many independent groups. We need not believe just one, but it takes a while. Entrenched groups hold on to their views and slow things down even more.

Because of slower social process, there is always an established picture of nature. Nature seems reduced to one set of concepts. What remains to be discovered seems not yet reduced, and soon will be. But there is absolutely no chance of it. Even a single new concept or doing can make innumerable changes in the implicit possibilities. Nature is never only the units we make and combine. Everything in nature is an implicit intricacy.

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